Working Papers
"Sponsored Link Auctions with Consumer Search"
I study a sponsored link auction game in which consumers sequentially search one set of products (the first page) before the other (the second page), and sellers compete in bids to place their product links at a higher position. By letting sellers choose product prices and auction bids together, I characterize the equilibrium of the second price auction with two payment schemes: fixed payment and per-transaction payment. I show different payment scheme results in different ranking of the surplus split between consumers, sellers and platform.
I study a sponsored link auction game in which consumers sequentially search one set of products (the first page) before the other (the second page), and sellers compete in bids to place their product links at a higher position. By letting sellers choose product prices and auction bids together, I characterize the equilibrium of the second price auction with two payment schemes: fixed payment and per-transaction payment. I show different payment scheme results in different ranking of the surplus split between consumers, sellers and platform.
"Pareto Optimality of Allocating the Bad", joint with Charles Z. Zheng
Given quasilinear independent private values, this paper proves a necessary and sufficient condition for all interim Pareto optimal mechanisms to allocate a commonly undesirable item with positive probabilities despite that not allocating it at all is part of an ex ante incentive efficient mechanism.
Given quasilinear independent private values, this paper proves a necessary and sufficient condition for all interim Pareto optimal mechanisms to allocate a commonly undesirable item with positive probabilities despite that not allocating it at all is part of an ex ante incentive efficient mechanism.
Published Papers
"Optimal Design for Redistributions among Endogenous Buyers and Sellers", joint with Charles Z. Zheng (Economic Theory 2022)
Working in Progress
“Timing to Cooperate: Procurement Auctions with Ex-ante and Ex-post Subcontracting”, joint with Ali Kamranzadeh
